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ABSTRACT 
 
The prevalent form of business organizations in Korea is a chaebol. The chaebol is a diversified 
conglomerate. This paper addresses the following issues concerning Korean chaebols:  1) reasons 
for diversification, 2) advantages and shortcomings of chaebols, 3) issues facing Korean chaebols, 
and 4) chaebols’ managing the crisis and making reforms. We found that Korean chaebols 
managed to learn from the economic crisis and made successful reforms. 
 
 
1.   Introduction 
  
ost large Korean firms are diversified conglomerates (Jung and Yang, 1992). The four largest of 
which are Samsung, LG, Hyundai Motor and SK based on sales in 2004. Samsung is the largest in 
sales; 63 companies make up the Samsung group. LG consists of 46 companies; Hyundai Motor 
has 28, and 59 companies make up the SK group. Diversified conglomerates dubbed chaebol in Korea, are the 
prevalent form of business organizations. As Khanna and Rivkin (2001) point out, such business groups are more 
common in emerging economies than in advanced economies. 
 
 Studies on firms‟ product portfolios focus on the why, where and what of diversification. The why of 
diversification is to discover determinants of product diversification. Teece (1980, 1982) has summarized that 
transaction costs, excess resources and scope economies account for product diversification. Studies on the where of 
diversification focus on the direction of firms‟ product diversification. Numerous studies report that related 
diversification contributes to firms‟ profits more than unrelated product diversification (Barney, 1988; Caves, 1971; 
Gorecki, 1975; Rumelt; 1982: Teece et al., 1994). What are the impacts of diversification? Remelt‟s study (1982) 
shows that “the highest levels of profitability were exhibited by those having a strategy of diversifying primarily into 
those areas that drew on some common core skill or resource” (p.359). Montgomery and Wenerfelt (1988) drew a 
similar conclusion that the farther firms must go to use their factors, the lower the marginal rents they extract. Teece 
et al. (1994) also found that given tight selection environments, coherent diversification is the most common 
corporate diversification mode in the U.S. economy as well as in other countries, especially in Korea. 
 
 This paper will explore the reasons why Korean chaebols are diversifying; study advantages and 
shortcomings of Korean chaebols; and assess chaebols‟ dynamic capabilities of managing the economic crisis and 
making reforms. The forms of organization clearly matter in firms‟ performance (Brickley et al., 2007; Milgrom & 
Roberts, 1992).  Thus assessing advantages and shortcomings will offer clues to improve Korean chaebols. Survey 
data in our earlier study (Park & Shin, 2004) provides the starting point for this analysis. 
 
 The paper consists of five sections.  Section 2 briefly surveys the literature; section 3 provides the design of 
the survey and reports the survey results.  We discuss the results in section 4 and present conclusions and 
implications in section 5.  
 
 
 
 
M 
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2.   Literature 
  
Excess capacity of production factors is regarded as the most important determinant of firms‟ product 
diversification (Caves, 1971; Gorecki, 1975; Penrose, 1959; Teece, 1982). According to the excess capacity of 
resources, firms diversify in response to excess capacity of resources that are subject to market failure (Montgomery 
and Wernerfelt, 1988). The firm may decide to use the capacity internally, instead of selling or renting it in an 
imperfect factor market, and these circumstances lead to diversification (Montgomery and Wernerfelt, 1988; 
Williamson, 1985). 
 
 Transaction cost theory (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975, 1985) offers an answer to the question of why not 
all production is carried on by one big firm. According to Coase (1937), “a firm will tend to expand until the costs of 
organizing an extra transaction within the firm equal the costs of carrying out the same transaction by means of an 
exchange on the open market or the costs of organizing in another firm.” Williamson (1975, 1985) indicated that 
volume, frequency, and asset specificity are determining factors of internal production or market. The frequent and 
large volume of production with a high degree of asset specificity leads to product diversification. 
 
 Scope economies (Chandler, 1990; Teece, 1980, 1982) give an advantage of diversification in production 
costs over the market. Our study investigates other factors of firms‟ product diversification that may be unique in 
Korean chaebols. Large Korean chaebols have the same proclivity of oligopoly. They tend to compete with each 
other. When one chaebol delves into a new business, other chaebols tend to rush into that business. 
 
 Chaebols may need to diversify to avoid declining profits in one industry. Schmalensee (1985) and Rumelt 
(1991) indicate that industry effects are the main sources of firm profitability. Demand growth in mature industries 
tends to be stagnant, so Korean chaebols typically expand in new and high-tech growth industries and diversify 
rather than exit from mature industries. 
 
 Since close family ties are the nature of Korean culture, owners of business firms try to give businesses to 
their children. These tendencies can also be a source of diversification in Korean chaebols. 
  
Benefits and shortcomings stem from the nature of Korean chaebols. Benefits can be scale and scope 
economies, vast knowledge and experiences in diversified businesses, reputation and brand name. Some 
characteristics of chaebols are disadvantages because they are diversified. 
   
 Simon (1993) views the history of organizations in evolutionary terms.  He states that each organization 
competes with others for scarce resources, and organizations‟ fates must consequently be decided by some 
combination of natural selection and rational adaptation. 
   
3. Designs And Conduct Of Survey 
 
 Our study examines Korean chaebols‟ learning from the Korean economic crisis. The survey questionnaire 
was designed to create a better understanding of the nature of Korean chaebols and their improvement. We created a 
website for the questionnaire and asked managers to answer questions. Two-hundred four managers, representing 
the majority of large business groups in Korea and many other firms, responded to the survey. The questionnaire 
was designed for respondents to rank the top three items in the order of importance among the listed factors in each 
question. To avoid confusion in priority ranking we did not ask respondents to rank all items in each question.  
 
3.1 Reasons For Diversification 
 
 The first survey question, regarding reasons for diversification, has designed to find out why Korean 
chaebols diversify. Weighting was used to signify the importance of each factor.  Each factor‟s weighted total score 
was calculated by giving more weight to rank 1 than rank 2; more weight to rank 2 than rank 3. For example, 36 
respondents ranked chaebols‟ competition with each other as the most important reason for chaebols‟ 
diversification; 38 respondents ranked it as the second most important reason; and 79 respondents ranked it as the 
International Business & Economics Research Journal – January 2008 Volume 7, Number 1 
59 
third most important reason. The total score for chaebols‟ diversification on competing with each other is 263, which 
is obtained as follows: 
36 X 3 + 38 X 2 + 79 X 1 = 263 
 
The rank of each factor is determined by the total score and Table 1 is the results of the survey on reasons 
for chaebols‟ diversification. 
 
 Diversification combines multiple business cycles from each product market, so lowering risk that is, 
smoothing out performance fluctuations (Salter and Weinhold, 1979). Diversification reduces the probability that a 
firm will experience lower performance, so firms   make adaptive change to avoid performance fluctuations 
(Donaldson, 2000). The benefits of such financial portfolio diversification for individuals are well established and 
proved, diversifying the corporate product portfolio is not as well established. However survey results show that 
diversification to avoid risks has the highest survey responses. 
 
 
Table 1: Reasons for Diversification 
 
Factors 
Responses 
1 2 3 Total Rank 
To avoid the risk of a single product business 88 61 34 420 1 
To participate in new businesses using new state of the art 
technologies 
59 69 32 347 2 
To compete with other chaebols 36 38 79 263 3 
To leave business as inheritance to children 9 26 38 117 4 
 Others  5 2 9 28 5 
 
 
 Large chaebols such as Samsung, LG and SK all developed in new products using new technologies. For 
example, all three participated in telecommunication as it emerged. Samsung and LG are now second and third in 
market share of mobile phone sales. They also tend to show the oligopoly behavior of competition: if one large firm 
enters into a new field in business, others tend to follow the leader. 
 
  
3.2 Benefits Of Chaebols 
 
 The survey question on benefits of chaebols included six items. Table 2 shows the survey results of 
respondents.  
 
Table 2: Benefits of Chaebols 
 
Factors 
Responses 
1 2 3 Total Rank 
Easy diversification in businesses with established reputation, and 
recognition of chaebols‟ brand name 
59 65 30 337 1 
Scope economies by synergy effects 71 36 40 325 2 
Scale economies by large size 33 35 37 206 3 
Improvements in decision making by having cumulated 
knowledge and experiences of many companies in a chaebol 
15 35 35 150 4 
Improvements in capturing new business opportunities with vast 
knowledge in many fields of business 
9 16 42 101 5 
Other 0 0 0 0 6 
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Survey respondents ranked easy diversification due to chaebols‟ brand name reputation and recognition on 
the top. According to Caves (1980), brand name is an intangible asset and brand name resource does not deplete as 
the firm uses it more. This result, therefore, supports the excess resource theory of diversification. 
 
Scores in scope and scale economies, 325 and 206 respectively, illustrate that diversified chaebols are well 
aware of the advantages of scope and scale economies. Chandler (1990) points out cost advantages due to U.S. 
business firms‟ scope and scale economies. Teece‟s (1982) paper on multiproducts of the firm shows the benefit of 
the scope economy of multiproducts. 
 
Improvements in decision making with cumulated knowledge and experiences of corporate leaders in the 
chaebols gathered a significant number of responses. Improvements in capturing new business opportunities also 
show some significance. These two factors are benefits of chaebols because the chaebol form of business 
conglomerates engages in businesses across several industries. Chaebol decision making groups also have a wealth 
of knowledge and experience. The knowledge-based approach to the firm values highly the importance of 
knowledge and experiences (Barney, 1986;  Grant, 1996; Knudsen, 1995; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995, Spencer, 
1996). 
 
3.3 Shortcomings Of Chaebols 
 
 The chaebol‟s organizational form has hazards as well as benefits. The negative aspects of chaebols need to 
be examined carefully to mitigate such hazards. The survey question designed to find out shortcomings of chaebols 
is informative.  
 
Table 3: Shortcomings of Chaebols 
 
Factors 
Responses 
1 2 3 Total Rank 
Lack of business transparency 30 51 22 214 1 
High risks of businesses due to the CEO‟s autocratic decision-
making 
37 29 40 209 2 
Increase in exit costs by losing timely exit of unprofitable 
businesses 
29 36 24 183 3 
Increase in management costs due to the bureaucratic 
organization 
36 23 27 181 4 
Inefficient resource allocation 24 13 34 132 5 
Lack of the timely decision making and adaptation 23 22 17 130 6 
Delay of development in core capabilities 10 13 20 76 7 
Other 0 0 1 1 8 
 
 
As the survey indicates, one of the pressing problems in chaebols is the lack of business transparency. The 
information asymmetry problems are ubiquitous in today‟s business world. However, the unique problem stemming 
from asymmetric information in chaebols is the governance problem, since the top managers or CEOs in chaebols 
tend to be both owners and managers. They are different from the hired managers with a small stake in the company. 
Managers with relatively large ownership stake in diversified Korean chaebols often engage in expropriating the 
dispersed minority shareholders; the lack of transparency magnifies this expropriation. 
 
 The highly autocratic decision-making in chaebols is dubbed as „imperialistic management‟ in the popular 
Korean press. This kind of management has adverse effects on corporate performance since managers do not fully 
utilize the knowledge and experiences of employees. However, the flip side of imperialistic management is that it 
may result in strong commitment to their favorite projects. It is a well-known fact that successes in Korean chaebols‟ 
telecommunication businesses are generated by CEOs‟ commitment of huge financial capital to research and 
development in semiconductor and telecommunication products. 
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 Chaebols‟ cross-subsidies often serve to prolong the lives of unprofitable businesses and delay their exits. 
These practices can be burdensome to the whole chaebol group. The costs caused by delayed exits led to collapses 
of several chaebols during the 1997 Korean economic crisis such as Dawwoo and Ssangyong. 
 
 Large organizations tend to be more bureaucratic and management costs rise as a result; significant 
numbers of respondents shared these concerns. Politics also play a role in large bureaucratic organization, and 
political decision making can result in inefficient resource allocation when bureaucratic organization loses timely 
decision making and adaptation to changing environments. These are shortcomings of the Korean chaebols. 
 
3.4 Issues Facing Korean Chaebols 
 
 Korean chaebols confronted many issues during and after the 1997 economic crisis. Understanding the 
nature of the issues is helpful in addressing them. A fourth survey question was designed to discover the issues 
facing Korean chaebols. 
 
The five important issues facing Korean chaebols (improving management, establishing business 
transparency, innovations in chaebols organization, new technology development, and reducing conflicts and 
establishing cooperation between labor and management) are related to the shortcomings of chaebols in Table 3.  
Perhaps the most pressing issue from the owners‟ perspectives today is the transition of ownership from parents to 
children. As owners of chaebols age and try to find ways to transfer ownership and management to children, these 
efforts waste entrepreneurs‟ talents and are not productive (Baumol, 1990; Murphy et al., 1991). Policy makers and 
Korean society need to find ways to reduce these wastes.  Expert managers also accompany hazards.  Hired 
managers with small ownership stakes generate large agency costs as seen in the U.S. corporations. 
 
 
Table 4: Issues facing Korean Chaebols 
 
Factors 
Responses 
1 2 3 Total Rank 
Improving management 47 42 24 249 1 
Establishing transparency 25 16 21 128 2 
Innovating in chaebol organization 12 26 38 126 3 
Developing new technology 15 24 19 112 4 
Reducing conflicts and establishing cooperation between labor 
and management 
24 9 15 105 5 
Maintaining international competitiveness in products 18 8 10 80 6 
Addressing lack of demand for products 19 14 9 94 7 
Coordinating growth and income distribution 12 18 14 86 8 
Finding skilled labor 6 17 15 67 9 
Dealing with excessive government intervention 8 8 7 47 10 
Managing problems associated with economic growth and 
environmental pollutions 
2 3 6 18 11 
Other 1 1 4 9 12 
 
  
 Because corporate entrepreneurs play a key role in corporate innovation and firm growth, a nation‟s 
economic growth depends heavily on the firm growth. As noted by Baumol (1968, 1990) and Murphy et al. (1991), 
the productive contribution of a society‟s entrepreneurial activities vary depending on the relative payoffs on the 
types of entrepreneurial activities. To foster economic growth, society and policy makers should therefore provide 
an environment for productive entrepreneurial activities. Murphy et al. (1991) found that in most countries, rent 
seeking rewards talent more than entrepreneurship does, leading to stagnation.  Therefore, a reduction in inheritance 
tax should be given careful attention to lower the transition costs.  Public policy makers and society also need to find 
ways to channel the inheritance taxes to investment in R & D to improve the chaebols‟ global competitiveness.    
 
 
International Business & Economics Research Journal – January 2008 Volume 7, Number 1 
62 
4.   Discussions 
 
4.1  Chaebols’ Diversification And Its Problems 
 
 Clearly, forms of organization matter in performances of the firm (Brickley, Smith and Zimmerman, 2007; 
Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). Chaebols offer some significant advantages. Teece (1982) pointed out that transaction 
costs, excess resources and scope economies are sources of the firm‟s product diversification. Here we have 
examined other sources of the firm‟s product portfolio diversification. Of course business performances vary 
depending on the business cycle and product life cycle. Salter and Weinhold (1979) point out that diversification 
combines multiple business cycles from each product market, thus lowering risk, that is, smoothing out performance 
fluctuations. Some products may be procyclical and others may be counter cyclical. If a firm produces a single 
product, the performance of the firm will change drastically based on the phases of the business cycle. Firms may be 
able to avoid drastic changes in performance by mixing various products in their product portfolio.  Our survey 
results show that diversification to avoid the risk of a single product obtained the largest number of responses. 
 
 Furthermore, profits or performances of the firm may decline when the firm‟s product reaches its maturity 
or decline stage of the product life cycle. To prevent such declining profits, firms diversify their products in newly 
emerging products to capture profits of the emerging growth industry, using newly emerging state of the art 
technology. Scholars in corporate strategy and industrial organization also have studied industry effects, corporate 
(business group) effects and business unit (firm) effects (Chang and Singh, 2000; Chang and Hong 2002; Rumelt, 
1991; Schmalensee, 1985) and found that industry effects are strong. Schmalensee (1985) argued that industry 
structures such as the number of firms, market share, and entry barriers in industries can affect firm performances. It 
is more likely that the degree of competition gets keener as the product life cycle reaches maturity or decline, 
increasing the probability of low profits of the firm. 
 
 It also appears that the oligopolistic behavior of chaebols adds a significant motive for firm diversification. 
Significant numbers of respondents indicate that chaebols diversify to compete with other chaebols.  Furthermore, 
large firms‟ decision to maximize are interdependent, as each firm speculates on the reactions of other firms in the 
industry (Caves, 1972; Hymer 1970, 1976). 
 
 
 Diversification for the purpose of an inheritance to children is not as strong as the other three factors 
discussed above; nevertheless it must not be totally ignored. The survey results indicate that the family ties are 
strong in Korean chaebols and inheritance considerations are likely to be more important for the owners of chaebols.  
When high inheritance taxes cause entrepreneurs to engage in non productive unlawful activities in corporate 
succession, chaebols will be less productive, leading to slower economic growth. 
 
 Because chaebols are well-established business groups, they enjoy better recognized brand names than 
newly starting firms. Brand names are intangible resources and can be utilized without being depleted as they were 
used in new businesses (Caves, 1980; Schmalensee, 1982). Schmalensee (1982) points out that late entrants are 
disadvantaged relative to pioneering brands for experience goods. Therefore, diversification is easier for chaebols 
than non-chaebol firms. Scale and scope economies are advantages of chaebols. Knowledge and experience in 
different products are advantageous in adapting changing environments. 
 
 However, chaebols also create difficulties.  Shortcomings of chaebols are primarily in management costs. 
Coase (1937) classified the firm‟s costs into management cost, factor costs and transaction costs, arguing that 
management and transaction costs are likely to increase as a firm produces more internally rather than buying from 
markets. Sako (1992) indicated that interscale wage differentials between large and small firms in Japan caused 
increased subcontracting (outsourcing) during the „60s in Japan. Increasing wages compared to productivity (Park, 
2000) in high income countries is reason that multinational firms move their production to lower income countries. 
Korean Chaebols experience high management costs and wages which make them less competitive in global 
markets. 
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 The lack of transparency of chaebols leads to problems of cross-subsidy, transfer pricing and self-dealing. 
These problems increase exit costs and inefficiency of chaebols. The owner and manger‟s „imperialistic 
management‟ in Korean chaebols have generated mixed experiences. Hanra, Haetae, Jinro and Ssangyong 
diversified to areas in which they did not have competencies and collapsed in the 1997 economic crisis. On the other 
hand, recent strong surges in telecommunication and electronics have contributed to the owner and manager‟s 
commitment to financial support for research and development. 
 
 Issues facing Korean chaebols confirm the problems of management and need to be addressed for chaebols 
to be more competitive. The chaebol form of business organization has advantages and shortcomings as discussed 
above. A test of chaebols became real in the 1997 economic crisis. Several chaebols were dissolved and changed 
ownership. For example, Daewoo groups, one of the big four chaebols before the crisis, became several independent 
single firms. Four units of the former Daewoo chaebols now belong to the top 50 businesses in Korea.  This is 
evidence that the 1997 economic crisis and learning forced Korean chaebols to adapt to rapidly changing global 
markets.  As a result they gained global competitiveness. 
 
5. Conclusions And Implications 
 
Traditional firm diversification theories study why, where and what of diversification. We have focused our 
study on why Korean chaebols are diversifying, issues facing chaebols, and chaebols` reforms after the 1997 
economics crisis. 
  
Researchers on firm diversification advocate that firms‟ sources of diversification are transaction cost, 
excess resources and scope economies. This study attempted to investigate other sources of chaebols` diversification 
in Korea. According to our Korean business firm survey Korean chaebols are diversifying to avoid risks stemming 
from a single product business, to participate in new business using newly emerging state of art technologies, and to 
compete with other chaebols. These three factors have not been well studied in firm diversification research, but 
scholars in firm diversification need to pay attention to these factors. 
  
Korean chaebols enjoy brand name recognition for their diversification, scale and scope economies, and 
accumulated knowledge and experiences in many business fields. However, Korean chaebols suffer from lack of 
business transparency, the CEO‟s autocratic decision making and increasing exit cost by cross-subsidy among firms 
within a chaebol. The primary issue facing Korean chaebols can be characterized as a management problem 
stemming from the complex nature of chaebols. Managerial and entrepreneurial roles have become crucial inputs in 
modern business corporation success as well as a nation‟s economic growth. Therefore, Korean chaebols‟ successful 
management is essential for the successes of chaebols as well as for Korean economic growth. 
  
We conclude that it is worthwhile for policy makers and scholars to pay attention to Korean chaebols‟ 
diversification and their dynamic capabilities. Korean chaebols also need to foster the advantages of chaebols and 
address shortcomings, particularly the problems in management, to continue to gain and to sustain competitive 
advantages in the global economy.  Chaebols‟ competitive advantages will then enhance the firm, increase 
performance employment and expand economic growth. 
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